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Note
Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical
Risk Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing
and Inappropriate at Parole
Pari McGarraugh*
Imagine you are sitting before a parole board. Now imagine
that your parole hearing is one of over 8000 the board will hear
1
this year—more than thirty cases each working day —and that
2
you have no lawyer to advocate for your cause. You know that
state law requires the parole board to consider the results of a
statistical risk assessment to determine your chances of recidi3
vism and thus the appropriateness of your release. Given the
rushed nature of the proceeding, it occurs to you that the board
4
is likely to weigh these results heavily. You ask for a copy of
the risk assessment instrument or even a copy of your risk re5
port and the parole board refuses. You start to wonder: What
* J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Professor Kevin Reitz for his insight and guidance. Thanks also to Michel Boudreaux for sharing his expertise in statistics. Endless thanks to my husband,
Jordan Miller, for his unwavering support, shockingly convincing dinosaur
impressions, and commitment to making fun a way of life—without him, I’d be
a complete bore. Copyright © 2013 by Pari McGarraugh.
1. SUSAN C. KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH
& SOC. POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE APAI INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES 9 (2008), available at http://paroleboard.arkansas.gov/
Resources/Documents/Publications/2008APAISurvey.pdf.
2. See Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that inmates do not have a constitutional right to have counsel or other advocates
attend parole hearings).
3. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-404(4)(a)(II) (2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-124a(m) (2009).
4. Cf. Vincent O’Leary & Daniel Glaser, The Assessment of Risk in Parole
Decision Making, in THE FUTURE OF PAROLE: COMMENTARIES ON SYSTEMS IN
BRITAIN AND U.S.A. 135, 136 (D.J. West ed., 1972) (finding that 79.4% of parole board members consider risk of recidivism if released to be a consideration which “significantly influenced their decision”).
5. Some states treat documents examined by the parole board as confidential and refuse access even to the inmate whose release is under consideration. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-53 (2012).
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factors is that risk assessment considering? Exactly what do
the results mean? And most importantly, can a statistical model really predict the future with enough reliability that it ought
to seal anyone’s fate?
A statistical risk assessment instrument provides a structured way for the criminal justice system to evaluate the prob6
ability that an individual will reoffend. Such an instrument
uses the statistical relationships between individual risk factors and criminal behavior to develop “explicit rules” that assign weights to risk factors and combine the weights to produce
7
“an objective estimate of violence risk.” A wide range of instruments are now in use, which accordingly have variable
8
power to predict future dangerousness. States have been using
risk assessment with increasing frequency and are unlikely to
9
halt their efforts on this front. Because the continued and accelerated use of risk assessment instruments in criminal justice
is inevitable, the relevant question is not if statistical risk assessment ought to be used, but how it can be responsibly used.
Presently, both sentencing judges and parole boards in
states using indeterminate sentencing models, those jurisdictions that allow the parole board discretionary release authori10
ty, routinely use statistical risk assessment instruments when
11
evaluating offenders. Inmates seeking parole release face the
board and statistical risk assessment largely without legal pro6. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405
(2006).
7. Id. at 405–06.
8. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 590 (1996).
9. This increasing emphasis on empirically-measured risk is apparent
from policy players with a wide range of political affiliations. See, e.g., AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 9 (2011),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf (arguing that states should “[r]equire [e]vidence-[b]ased [c]riminal [j]ustice
[p]ractices and [r]isk [a]ssessment [i]nstruments”); Priority Issues: Adult Probation, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/priority-issues/adult
-probation/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (“Probation can be made particularly
efficient through the use of risk assessments . . . .”).
10. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54
EMORY L.J. 377, 382–83 (2005).
11. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12 (describing risk assessment at
parole); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?,
23 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 157 (2010) (reporting that in at least ten states, sentencing judges use risk assessment instruments).
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tection —they are not typically represented by counsel, the
14
rules of evidence do not apply, and only the barest procedure
15
is required to satisfy due process. By contrast, more robust
protections are available to defendants post-conviction at sentencing. These protections include, critically, the right to coun16
sel and the requirement that evidence introduced must meet a
17
minimum standard of reliability.
This Note argues in support of a recent draft of section
6B.09 of the Model Penal Code (MPC) which suggests limiting
18
the use of statistical risk assessment to the sentencing stage.
Because there is meaningful protection for criminal defendants
19
at sentencing that is not present at parole, using statistical
risk assessment at sentencing polices a basic line of fairness to
criminal defendants. This Note expands upon the reasoning of
the MPC by examining, in depth, the statistical and legal
weaknesses of risk assessment instruments. Part I sets forth
the basic protections available to defendants and inmates in
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions at parole and sentencing and describes the panoply of statistical risk assessment instruments and their use. Part II explores the practical and legal limitations of these risk assessment instruments. Part III
articulates the reasons why section 6B.09 is a reasonable compromise between fairness to defendants and protecting public
safety and argues for an addition to the section establishing
statutory criteria for determining if a risk assessment instrument is “sufficiently reliable.”

12. Not all states stick to the bare constitutional minimum in parole proceedings. Some states provide for greater protection through statute. E.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-670(3)(b) (2011) (allowing inmates to be represented in
parole hearings).
13. N.M. CODE R. § 22.510.2.8(A)(3) (2001) (prohibiting legal counsel from
attending parole hearings); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. See Davis v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting
that the parole board may rely on hearsay evidence).
15. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
16. Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
17. E.g., People v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1371 (Ill. 1986).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011).
19. Compare, e.g., Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (right to
counsel at sentencing), with Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1976) (no
counsel at parole hearing).
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I. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS
20

In indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions, the exact
length of a defendant’s sentence is not known at the time of
sentencing because the judge only designates a minimum and
21
maximum sentence. Once the inmate has served the minimum term, a parole board determines the actual length of a
sentence because the board decides when parole release is ap22
propriate for each offender. Together, the parole board and
the sentencing judge share responsibility for determining the
23
length of an offender’s sentence. This sharing of decisionmaking power is designed to ensure that “no man be imprisoned unless it is clear that his freedom is dangerous to others,
and that when once imprisoned, no man be freed until the dan24
ger has ceased.” Because a defendant has a more substantial
liberty interest in the character of the sentencing procedure
than an inmate has in the procedures for making parole release
decisions, the Constitution demands distinctly different protec25
tions at each stage. Despite these differing levels of protec26
27
tion, both sentencing judges and parole release boards are
likely to use statistical risk assessment to guide their decisions.

20. By Professor Kevin Reitz’s count, over half of the states have sentencing and parole systems that incorporate indeterminate decision-making mechanisms. Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 270, 289 n.1
(Joan Petersilia ed., 2012) [hereinafter Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model].
21. LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 93 (8th ed. 2010).
22. DEAN J. CHAMPION, PROBATION, PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 241 (2d ed. 1996); Chanenson, supra note 10, at 382–83.
23. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 467
(James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) (noting the multiple decisionmakers involved in sentencing).
24. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 94 (1976) (quoting Charlton T. Lewis).
25. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 283.
26. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N,
OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION 11–12
(2002).
27. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., INST. ON CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORR. AT
GEORGE WASH. UNIV., RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY STUDY OF THE LSI-R RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 5 (2003) (“Once an inmate becomes eligible for parole, the decision to release that inmate is guided by an assessment of the inmate’s risk to public safety.”); KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12 (finding
88% of releasing authorities nationally use risk assessment instruments).
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A. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION AT SENTENCING AND AT PAROLE
Individuals are certainly interested in both sentencing decisions and parole release decisions because both affect the
amount of time an individual will spend incarcerated. But the
Supreme Court has made clear that inmates have much less legal interest in parole decisions than criminal defendants have
28
in sentencing decisions. At sentencing, the defendant has a
constitutional liberty interest and corresponding due process
29
right in the character of the procedure employed. At parole,
courts typically have found that inmates’ liberty interest in parole release is constrained by the language of the state statute
30
governing parole. Not all state parole systems create liberty
31
interests in parole release. To give rise to a liberty interest,
the statute must do more than establish a system for granting
32
parole release. It must create an entitlement to such release,
which would lead to a grievous loss if parole release were de33
nied. A statute might create an entitlement and the corresponding grievous loss by, for example, providing that an in34
mate “shall” be released if certain criteria are met, or by
substantially limiting the parole board’s discretion in making
35
release decisions. Based on the line of cases establishing this
rule, state legislatures have deliberately phrased parole stat36
utes so that they do not create liberty interests. Accordingly,
28. Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (finding that
the Constitution requires the state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant
facing potential incarceration), with Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“There is a crucial distinction between
being deprived of a liberty one has . . . and being denied a conditional liberty
that one desires.”).
29. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981) (analyzing a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d
858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (finding that imposing longer sentences on men than
on women, without a justifying government interest, violates the Equal Protection Clause).
30. E.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 372 (1987).
31. E.g., id. (noting that Montana does not provide a liberty interest in
parole).
32. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480–81, 483–84 (1995).
33. Id.
34. E.g., Allen, 482 U.S. at 377–78.
35. E.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989), partially overruled on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 n.5.
36. See, e.g., Worden v. Mont. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 962 P.2d 1157,
1165 (Mont. 1998) (“In response to Allen, the Montana legislature amended
[the parole statute] to state that ‘the Board may release’ inmates on parole . . . ” (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1989))).
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states typically afford inmates considerably less procedural
37
protection at parole than at sentencing.
The courts have not examined the outside limits on the
types of procedures a parole board may or may not use for two
reasons. First, inmates do not challenge the denial of parole as
often as defendants challenge sentences because “meaningful
review . . . is lacking in virtually all American parole sys38
tems.” Second, because state law frequently prohibits inmates
39
from examining their own dossiers and parole boards are not
typically required to articulate their reasons for denying pa40
role, an inmate may not have enough information about the
41
parole board’s decision to object to it. In a similar vein, the parole process itself is often opaque—to inmates, to judges, and to
42
the general public. Even though states typically lay out parole
43
processes in statute, it may be difficult to verify if parole
boards are following statutory procedures because state law
may not require the parole board to produce a record of its pro44
ceedings. The lack of both judicial guidance and transparency
means that an inmate’s rights at parole are not as well-defined
45
as a defendant’s rights are at sentencing. Despite the uncertainty regarding the precise limits of required procedural protection, several things are clear: the right to counsel, evidentiary standards, and the qualifications of the decision-maker
are distinctly different at sentencing and parole.

37. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 283 (noting
that if the procedural protections at sentencing are “second-string,” the “procedural accoutrements of parole release are of the third- or fourth-string variety”).
38. Id. at 285.
39. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.510 (LexisNexis 2010).
40. See Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich. 1999).
41. The American Law Institute argues for placing risk assessment at
sentencing because “substantive concerns . . . will no doubt be brought forward
in the courtroom setting—issues that were never raised in the low-visibility,
low-process forums of parole release.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
42. See, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1389, 1404 (2008) (noting that sentencing judges are consistently ignorant of
parole procedures and practices).
43. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 24-15-1 to 30 (2012).
44. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 285.
45. See id.
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1. The Right to Counsel
The distinction between the right to counsel at the sentencing stage and at the parole stage is straightforward. At sentencing, the defendant facing potential imprisonment has a
46
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney.
Moreover, an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed coun47
sel at sentencing. By contrast, there is no constitutional right
48
to counsel at parole hearings. This difference appears to be
premised on the fundamentally different liberty interests in49
volved at each stage.
At sentencing, courts emphasize that even though the convicted defendant does not have a legal interest in what sentence the court imposes, the defendant does have an interest in
50
the quality of the decision-making process. Representation at
51
this “critical stage of the proceedings” ensures that defendants
take the appropriate steps to preserve their right to appeal sen52
tencing decisions. Further, a vigorous defense at sentencing
evens the playing field in a way that is “essential to the truthseeking function . . . which may influence the sentencing deci53
sion.” A defense lawyer is responsible for ensuring that the
54
“sentence [is] not predicated on misinformation.” In this way,
the right to counsel goes hand in hand with the application of
55
evidentiary standards, discussed below.

46. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
47. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
48. See Franciosi v. Mich. Parole Bd., 604 N.W.2d 675, 676 (Mich. 2000)
(finding that, without a discussion constitutional rights, the state statute did
not permit lawyers to “act as a legal representative of a prisoner during a parole interview”).
49. Compare Rhay, 389 U.S. at 137 (framing the right to counsel in constitutional terms), with Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466
(1981) (framing the liberty interest at parole in relation to the procedural protections offered by the state statute).
50. E.g., Perdue v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Ky. 2002).
51. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895,
903 n.13 (Mass. 2004).
52. Rhay, 389 U.S. at 135 (finding that legal representation is important
because “certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage”).
53. Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
54. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
55. See id. (connecting the right to counsel at sentencing with protection
against receiving a sentence based on inaccurate evidence).
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2. Evidentiary Standards
Although the rules of evidence applicable at the guilt stage
56
of a trial do not attach in either sentencing or parole hearings,
defendants and inmates are entitled to some protection because
neither sentencing judges nor parole board members may con57
sider certain kinds of evidence. Insofar as there are evidentiary limits, they fall into two broad categories. First, at least
at sentencing, evidence must meet a minimal standard of relia58
bility. Second, sentencing judges and parole boards may make
only limited use of certain characteristics of the defendant or
59
inmate such as race, nationality, and gender.
a. Reliability of Evidence
In general, sentencing judges have wide discretion to con60
sider whatever evidence they find useful. However, this dis61
cretion is not unlimited. Evidence considered at sentencing
must be accurate enough to guarantee the defendant’s due pro62
cess rights. A sentencing judge may not base her decision on
63
information that is “extensively and materially false” and she
64
may only consider evidence that is “relevant and reliable.” Defense attorneys can, and do, challenge expert evidence offered

56. E.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010) (sentencing);
see, e.g., Davis v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (parole).
57. People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1317 (Ill. 1986).
58. People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 261, 271 (Ill. 1984).
59. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (the
court may not consider the defendant’s race when imposing a sentence); Tex.
Supporters of Workers World Party Pres. Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. Supp.
149, 155 (D.C. Tex. 1981) (recognizing the right to be considered for parole
“without invidious discrimination based on race or national origin”). But see
Wildermuth v. Furlong, 147 F.3d 1234, 1239 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting circuit disagreement on whether a substantive due process right can be violated
in the absence of a liberty interest at parole which gives rise to a procedural
due process right).
60. State v. Conn, 669 P.2d 581, 583 (Ariz. 1983).
61. Id.
62. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (“We have . . . sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the basis of misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447 (1972))). Note that evidentiary standards tend to use “reliable”
to mean “accurate” or “valid,” despite the fact that the two terms have distinct
meanings in the scientific and statistical literature. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).
63. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
64. People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1317 (Ill. 1986).
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65

by the prosecution at sentencing as unreliable. Even when the
sentencing judge finds the evidence reliable and admits it, the
effort in raising the objection is not wasted. The objection sensitizes the court to the limitations of the evidence and may in66
spire the court to afford the evidence less weight. The situation at parole is markedly different. Although the contours of
an inmate’s due process right to have a release decision based
67
on reliable information are not defined, it is clear that parole
boards routinely consider exceptionally unreliable evidence like
68
“unsubstantiated rumors.”
69
Only one appellate court has considered whether statistical risk assessment to predict future dangerousness is reliable
70
enough to be admitted in a sentencing hearing. The Indiana
Supreme Court reviewed the literature on statistical risk assessment and concluded that the instrument in question, the
Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), was “statistically
71
valid, reliable, and effective in forecasting recidivism.”
Though the evidence was admitted, the defendant’s objection
was productive because the court explicitly opined that a sentencing judge may not base the sentence solely on the results of
72
the instrument.
b. Prohibited Categories of Evidence
There is extensive case law suggesting that neither sentencing judges, nor parole boards may base decisions on a de65. E.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. 2010); see Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 102, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
66. See State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317, 320 (S.C. 1982) (“[T]he appellant’s objection was addressed to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.”).
67. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011) (noting that parole release is “low-visibility, low-process” and unlikely to encourage meaningful review).
68. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 284 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 16
(“[I]t seems that [Parole Boards] are willing to listen to anyone with
knowledge of or interest in the offender’s case.”).
69. Warren, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that only the Indiana Supreme
Court has considered the issue).
70. In two opinions issued the same day, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed the admission of risk assessment results in sentencing hearings.
Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573; J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Ind. 2010).
71. Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 573.
72. Id. at 568.

1088

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
73

[97:1079

74

fendant’s or inmate’s race, gender, or national origin without
75
adequate justification. In the sentencing context, the Constitution does not categorically prohibit consideration of race,
gender or nationality; it simply prohibits certain kinds of con76
sideration. In particular, consideration of gender at sentencing “must pass heightened scrutiny by substantially furthering
77
a legitimate government interest.” For example, in United
States v. Maples, the reviewing court found that the sentencing
judge unconstitutionally imposed a longer sentence on a male
78
defendant than on a female co-defendant. Specifically, the
court found that because there was no link between female
gender and the policy goals of rehabilitation or deterrence, it
79
could not use gender as a factor in sentencing.
Classifications based on race or ethnicity in sentencing
80
must typically pass an even more rigorous test. In that instance, the court requires more than a simple connection between the protected category and a general propensity to deterrence or rehabilitation to legitimate the racial or ethnic
classification. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. BorreroIsaza, found that the trial judge unconstitutionally considered
the defendant’s Colombian nationality when setting his sen-

73. United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (sentencing);
Tex. Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake,
511 F. Supp. 149, 155 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (parole).
74. Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D. N.C. 2000) (sentencing); see Walker v. Luther, 644 F. Supp. 76, 81 (D. Conn. 1986) (finding
parole standards that established different standards for men and women violated the Equal Protection Clause because the state failed to articulate a rational basis for the disparate treatment).
75. United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1355–56 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sentencing); Parisie v. Morris, 873 F. Supp. 1560, 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (parole).
76. E.g., United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that a sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s nationality when determining “the identity of the countries which are recognized as often the
source” of the drugs involved in the underlying crime).
77. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 137 (1993)).
78. 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974).
79. Id.
80. Challenges to the use of race at sentencing are raised under both the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. See United States v.
Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 804 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). While the tests for these two
constitutional protections are different, the result is largely the same as race
is not generally a permissible consideration at sentencing under either test.
See id.
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81

tence following a conviction for a drug crime. The court suggested there would have to be specific evidence demonstrating
a direct connection between the defendant’s nationality and his
crime, for example, if the defendant had trafficked drugs from
Colombia, for his Colombian nationality to be relevant to his
82
sentence. As discussed below, this prohibition on considering
race, gender, and nationality characteristics that are unconnected to the commission of the convicted crime has significant
ramifications in terms of the positive predictive power of statistical risk assessment instruments because gender and race are
83
strong predictors of recidivism.
3. Qualifications of the Decision-Maker
The most obvious difference between sentence-length decisions made at parole and those made at sentencing is the iden84
tity of the decision-maker. At sentencing, a judge is typically
85
86
calling the shots. Although they may be appointed or elected,
all trial judges are experienced in assessing the weight of evi87
88
dence, facilitating the adversarial truth-finding process, and
89
remaining objective. By contrast, parole board members, typi90
cally appointed by the governor, make the decision to release
91
or not release a particular inmate. Because “political connec81. 887 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 1356.
83. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583.
84. See Reitz, Sentencing, supra note 23, at 467.
85. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948).
86. See Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer’s
Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 530 (1991)
(describing methods of selecting judges in the United States).
87. Cf. David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1088
(1989) (noting that the judge’s admissibility decision is followed by the trier-offact’s determination of what weight the evidence deserves).
88. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (noting the Court’s
“belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking
function of trials”).
89. Not surprisingly, there is a mass of literature questioning the objectivity of judges. See, e.g., Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 860 (2010). This preoccupation with
the failures of judicial objectivity illuminates the centrality of the goal of impartiality.
90. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 7 (finding that governors appoint
85% of releasing authorities with fixed terms of office).
91. Id. at 10.
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tions are often the main prerequisite for appointment” to a pa92
role board, and because the process of parole is largely invisi93
ble to the public, there is a risk that the parole board might be
susceptible to political pressure. As one Arkansas parole board
member put it: “If the governor likes you, you might get to keep
94
your job.” Although it is popular to say that parole board
members are “experts” in determining when release is appro95
priate, this may not be the case as many states have excep96
tionally minimal requirements for board membership.
Together, the availability of counsel, the requirement of
minimally reliable evidence, and qualified judicial oversight
provide a relatively robust system of procedural protection for
defendants at sentencing. By contrast, the protection for inmates seeking parole release is flimsy. These differences in
procedural protection offer a defendant seeking a fair sentencing process more points of intervention than an inmate hoping
for parole release is likely to have.
B. STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
The details of state criminal sentencing systems vary widely, but both sentencing judges and parole boards may use sta97
tistical risk assessment to inform their decisions. Before considering the appropriate procedural placement for such risk
assessment instruments, it is worthwhile to examine the instruments themselves, the theory underlying their develop92. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 285.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011).
94. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 285 (quoting
Arkansas Times Staff & Max Brantley, Web Special: Dumond Case Revisited,
ARK. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/web-specialdumond-case-revisited/Content?oid=862759).
95. See THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, supra note 24, at 117 (noting that a parole board is to “administer
[its] decision in accordance with its expertise”).
96. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-5(2) (2009) (requiring only that parole
board members have “at least a bachelor’s degree or a high school diploma and
four (4) years’ work experience”).
97. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N,
supra note 26, at 11–12 (sentencing); KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 12
(parole); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(a) (“A person . . . may be allowed
to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the Board of Parole . . .
if (1) it appears . . . that there is a reasonable probability that such inmate will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law . . . .”); AUSTIN, supra note
27, at 5 (“Once an inmate becomes eligible for parole, the decision to release
that inmate is guided by an assessment of the inmate’s risk to public safety.”).
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ment, and their purposes in the punishment process. The focus
of this Note is on the use of statistical risk assessment to aid in
sentencing and parole release decisions. These are not the only
possible uses of statistical instruments. State departments of
corrections and parole also use these instruments to assess the
rehabilitative needs of inmates, probationers, and those on pa98
role release. Although statistical models are sometimes used
99
to assess both needs and risk and the two are occasionally
100
treated interchangeably, needs assessment is distinct from
101
risk assessment. Needs assessment has a broader focus and
attempts to match an offender with optimal corrections pro102
gramming. By contrast, risk assessment focuses on measuring an individual’s chances of endangering public safety by
103
reoffending.
States use a wide variety of instruments for risk assessment. Some use commercially-developed instruments, like the
104
105
LSI-R or its progeny. Others use instruments developed in106
house by state agencies. A survey conducted by the Center for
Research on Youth and Social Policy reported that eighteen
states developed their own instrument in-house, twelve states
use the LSI-R instrument, and nine states use one or more of
107
an array of other instruments. In general, these instruments
98. See, e.g., STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF CORR., CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK
ASSESSMENT STRATEGY 5 (2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/
PDF/PDFReport/RiskAssessmentStrategy.pdf (“The following assessment instruments are utilized for the purposes of risk, program needs and interventions, classification, development of the Offender Accountability Plan, facility
assignment and discharge planning.”).
99. See id.
100. See D.A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk
and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 7 passim (2006).
101. This fact is frequently noted. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (“Needs and risk assessments are
distinct tasks . . . .”); see also NANCY M. CAMPBELL, NAT’L INST. OF CORR.,
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PAROLING AUTHORITIES IN AN ERA OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 37 (2008) (describing the difference between the
“needs principle” and the “risk principle”).
102. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N,
supra note 26, at 44.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES L. BONTA, MULTI-HEALTH SYS., INC.,
LSI-R: LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORY-REVISED (2008), available at

http://www.assessments.com/assessments_documentation/LSI-R%20Technical%
20Brochure.pdf.

105. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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require input of a number of data points about the defendant or
inmate including factors related to criminal history, family life,
108
education, and employment history. These data points may
be either static factors, meaning that they will not change during the individual’s incarceration, or dynamic factors, meaning
that the input value may change if the individual’s behavior or
109
attitudes change. For example, the STATIC-99 risk assessment instrument, used by seventeen states to evaluate sex of110
fenders’ risk of recidivism, uses static factors like whether
111
the individual has prior convictions. Dynamic factors take account of the inmate’s post-incarceration behavior. Factors
might include, for example, whether an inmate has completed
112
correctional programming while incarcerated. Although the
113
vast majority of instruments do not explicitly consider race,
many consider other factors that have considerable overlap
114
with race, most notably neighborhood of residence.
Some
115
states employ instruments that use gender as a predictor, or
116
have developed separate instruments for men and women.

108. See, e.g., ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 104.
109. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 575–76.
110. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13.
111. STATIC-99 Tally Sheet, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www
.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99-coding-rules_e71.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
112. Maryland’s instrument includes this measure. SHAMIR RATANSI &
STEPHEN M. COX, STATE OF CONN., ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION OF
CONNECTICUT’S SALIENT FACTOR SCORE unpublished Appendix C (2007) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Appendix C].
113. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 280. One
judge in Oregon has developed a “sentencing support” software program that
considers race/ethnicity in developing a risk profile for a defendant. MICHAEL
MARCUS, SENTENCING SUPPORT TOOLS: USER MANUAL FOR JUDGES 10 (2009).
This strategy appears to be unique.
114. See ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 104 (including neighborhood of
residence in the “accommodation” factor of the LSI-R); Alexander M. Holsinger
et al., Ethnicity, Gender, and the Level of Service Inventory-Revised, 31 J.
CRIM. JUST. 309, 315, 318 (2003) (noting racial trends in seven of ten areas
measured by the LSI-R).
115. E.g., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 27. Interestingly, members of parole boards report
that they only very rarely consider the offender’s gender in making their parole release decisions. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 19. This may indicate that the parole board is unaware of whether the risk assessment rolls
gender into the score an inmate receives.
116. THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT 13 (2010), available at http://www
.criminologycenter.fsu.edu/p/pdf/pretrial/Broward%20Co.%20COMPAS%
20Validation%202010.pdf.
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Risk assessment scores may be obtained based on interviews,
118
pen and paper checklists, or by automatically extracting data
119
from the inmate or defendant’s record. The personnel respon120
sible for administering risk assessments varies state by state;
but, in any case, significant staff training is necessary to administer the instruments competently and with consistent pro121
ficiency.
Methods of writing statistical risk assessment instruments
122
fall into two categories. First, an instrument may be based on
123
empirical data. This type of instrument is developed by drawing a sample of offenders, observing recidivism rates as well as
other offender characteristics and then using the statistical relationships between these characteristics and recidivism to
124
build the instrument. Once built, the risk assessment instrument produces individual numeric risk scores depending on
125
the characteristics of the individual being assessed. For example, Virginia used a common statistical method, multivariate logistic regression, to construct a risk assessment instrument that estimates risk of recidivism based on eleven factors
including gender, age, employment status, and factors related
126
to prior criminal behavior. Risk assessment instruments may
117. Holsinger et al., supra note 114, at 310 (describing administration of
the LSI-R).
118. Tammy Meredith et al., Developing and Implementing Automated
Risk Assessments in Parole, 9 JUST. RESEARCH & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007).
119. Id.
120. For example, in Connecticut, prison personnel are responsible for administering risk assessment instruments, see STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF
CORR., supra note 98, at 5, while in Los Angeles County, probation officers are
responsible for ongoing risk and needs assessment with their probationers, see
SUSAN TURNER & TERRY FAIN, VALIDATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY
PROBATION DEPARTMENT’S RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS, at xi
(2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201303.pdf.
121. Anthony W. Flores et al., Predicting Outcome with the Level of Service
Inventory-Revised: The Importance of Implementation Integrity, 34 J. CRIM.
JUST. 523, 528 (2006); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15.
122. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS: REDUCING THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS AND DELINQUENTS 63 (2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Kirk Heilbrun et al., Violence Risk Assessment Tools: Overview
and Critical Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 1, 5
(Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (noting that empirically derived risk assessment instruments produce reproducible scores based on the
“predictor variables”).
126. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 26–27.
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127

also be developed theoretically. Theoretical risk assessment
instruments measure variables that are, according to psychology or criminology experts, “theoretically related” to recidi128
vism and then measure the statistical relationship between
129
these variables and recidivism in populations. Theoretical
130
risk assessment instruments, including the popular LSI-R,
typically use the correlation between values of variables and
131
recidivism risk to assign weights to inmates’ responses. The132
se weights are added to produce numeric risk scores. Risk assessment instruments developed through either method typically produce risk scores on a finite scale, for example, from
133
zero to twelve. Risk instruments themselves do not necessarily resolve downstream policy choices of determining meaningful
134
cutoffs in risk scores.
In general it is difficult for a lay person to access information about a state’s policy with respect to risk assessment
135
instruments. Often states do not readily provide information
about which risk assessment they use, how the instruments
were developed, or how they are used in practice. For example,
a request for the “risk assessment instrument . . . along with

127. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 63.
128. Id.; see also PETER RAYNOR ET AL., RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT IN
PROBATION SERVICES: AN EVALUATION 9 (2000), available at http://library
.npia.police.uk/docs/hors/hors211.pdf (describing the selection of items in the
LSI-R as “intended to have a theoretical and professional rationale justifying
the selection of these particular items as relevant to offending”).
129. MACKENZIE, supra note 124, at 63.
130. See, e.g., Holsinger et al., supra note 114, at 310.
131. See, e.g., Risk to Re-offend Score Chart, GA. STATE BOARD PARDONS &
PAROLES, http://www.pap.state.ga.us/opencms/export/sites/default/resources/
RISK_TO_RE.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (laying out Georgia’s summation
scoring method).
132. Id.
133. STATIC-99 Tally Sheet, supra note 111.
134. Although the responsibility for determining the acceptable level of risk
rests with the states, the developers of risk assessment instruments may provide guidance on how state officials, including parole boards and judges ought
to interpret the results. See, e.g., D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & Stephen
Wormith, The Level of Service (LS) Assessment of Adults and Older Adolescents, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 125, at 199,
205.
135. See Susan J. Sachsenmaier & Stephen J. Lally, Toward a Scientific
Foundation of Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT 26–27 (David P. Farrington et al.
eds., 2001).
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136

any accompanying documentation or manuals for its use”
made under New York’s Freedom of Information Law yields only a copy of a memorandum from the Chairwoman of New
York’s Board of Parole explaining appropriate use of the state’s
137
newest instrument, and a printout of the risk assessment
138
scoring sheet. No information about the design or validation
of the instrument is provided. Given the range of possible
methods by which a statistical risk assessment instrument may
be prepared and the nuanced ways in which this method affects
the validity and reliability of the instrument, as discussed below, the unavailability of this type of information is troubling.
II. STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT’S LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL LIMITATIONS
True risk assessment instruments are creatures of statistics and thus are subject to a number of inherent limitations.
No matter how thorough the analysis, no statistical model can
139
ever be completely accurate. Uncertainty in the result produced is inevitable. For example, a hypothetical risk assessment instrument might predict that a particular offender has a
25% probability of reoffending. That 25% is a point estimate.
Such a point estimate does not express how confident a statistician is in that the estimate is accurate. To understand the degree of confidence, statisticians look to a confidence interval indicating the range of possible values around the point estimate
140
that the true value is likely to be. Perhaps the instrument is
very robust and produces a very narrow confidence interval—
say, that evaluator is 95% sure that the true value of the offender’s risk of reoffending is between 24% and 26%. Alternatively, the instrument might be very weak and produce a 95%
confidence interval of between 10% and 40%.
Because perfection is not possible, states ought to face
head-on the issue of uncertainty and develop strategies for
136. Letter from Pari McGarraugh, to Patrick Lawlor, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. &
Comm. Supervision, Counsel’s Office (Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with author).
137. Memorandum from Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman, N.Y. Dep’t of
Corr. & Comm. Supervision, to the Members of the Board of Parole (Oct. 5,
2011) (on file with author).
138. COMPAS REENTRY ASSESSMENT (2007) (on file with author).
139. Emma J. Palmer, Risk Assessment: Review of Psychometric Measures,
in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT,
supra note 135, at 7.
140. RAND R. WILCOX, BASIC STATISTICS: UNDERSTANDING CONVENTIONAL
METHODS AND MODERN INSIGHTS 103 (2009).
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141

managing it. Despite how important it is to resolve questions
of predictive power, not all states directly address the problem.
In fact, only about 85% of states using risk assessment instruments report having validated the instruments in the state’s
142
own population in any way. The following sections outline
these concerns by examining weaknesses of statistical risk assessment instruments both theoretically and in practice.
A. THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING RISK ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS ARE OFTEN UNJUSTIFIED
As discussed above, risk assessments are typically based
on the results of regression models or are constructed as
143
weighted sums.
Instruments based on regression models
make several assumptions related to their external validity.
First, regression models assume random selection, meaning
that each individual in the population of interest has an equal
144
chance of being included in the sample. Second, regression
models assume independence of observations, meaning that the
behavior of each individual in the population is entirely unre145
lated to the behavior of any of the others. In the context of
risk assessment, neither of these assumptions is likely to be
146
justified. High quality data on recidivism is scarce and certain types of outcomes, like whether an incarcerated person
would have reoffended if released, are counterfactual and in147
herently impossible to measure directly. For this reason, data
sets underlying risk assessment instruments tend to be “convenience samples” rather than true random samples drawn
148
from the population of interest. Furthermore, individuals in
these samples are rarely independent because they are likely to
141. Cf. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N,
supra note 26, at 29–30 (describing Virginia’s method of determining an appropriate risk threshold for diverting an offender from incarceration).
142. KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13.
143. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 63.
144. Richard A. Berk & David A. Freedman, Statistical Assumptions as
Empirical Commitments, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF SHELDON L. MESSINGER 245 n.1 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley
Cohen eds., 1995).
145. Id. at 245 n.1, n.4.
146. Id. at 246.
147. Cf. Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Risk/Need Assessment, Offender
Classification, and the Role of Childhood Abuse, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR
543, 548–49 (2001) (including only those inmates released on parole in the validation study).
148. See Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 246.
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have shared influences like supervision by the same parole of149
ficer. Indeed, such samples are likely to be inherently clus150
tered around particular programs or geographic locations.
That such clustered observations are likely not to be independent because individuals systematically share characteristics
does not necessarily bias the result of an analysis, but it does
151
result in an overestimate of certainty.
Even if the sample is properly drawn and the analysis perfectly conducted, statistical models only predict probable behavior for a typical member of the population from which the origi152
nal sample was drawn. This poses obvious problems when the
sample population is very different than the one in which the
153
risk assessment instrument is to be used. For example, the
LSI-R was developed in populations of Canadian inmates, and,
although the instrument was validated in inmate populations
in the United States, the validation may provide false comfort
154
as its sample included predominantly Caucasian inmates.
This methodological quirk is not benign; other research shows
that the LSI-R predicts recidivism much less effectively for Af155
rican-Americans and Hispanics than for Caucasians. Assuming a close match between the sample population and the population in which the instrument is to be applied, a good risk
156
assessment instrument still only predicts average behaviors.
The instrument cannot predict the behavior of any one individ-

149. See id. at 250.
150. See id. at 246 (noting “the data in hand are simply the data most readily available”).
151. See Jeromy Anglim, Clustered Samples and Assuming Independence of
Observations, JEROMY ANGLIM’S BLOG: PSYCHOLOGY AND STATISTICS (Feb. 26,
2010),
http://jeromyanglim.blogspot.com/2010/02/clustered-samples-and
-assuming.html.
152. See Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245.
153. See Lowenkamp et al., supra note 147, at 560 (conceding that the results of the validation study are limited if the sample was not representative).
154. Melinda D. Schlager & David J. Simourd, Validity of the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) Among African American and Hispanic Male
Offenders, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 545, 546 (2007).
155. Id. at 553.
156. Kathleen Auerhahn, Selective Incapacitation and the Problem of Prediction, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 703, 708 (1999).
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157

ual. By definition, these risk assessment instruments fail to
158
account for atypical behavior.
In addition, risk assessment instruments based on either
summation models, such as the LSI-R, or regressions are subject to an additional key limitation. Unless specifically designed
to do so, the instrument cannot account for interaction between
input measures. They assume that the uptick in risk of recidivism associated with each input factor remains constant re159
gardless of inputs on other risk factors. To illustrate, Georgia’s risk assessment instrument, used to guide parole release
decisions, uses a summation model and assigns two risk
“points” to an offender who has a history of drug or alcohol
160
abuse no matter the inmate’s age when he entered prison.
Georgia’s model assumes that at every age, a history of drug or
161
alcohol abuse has the same effect on risk of recidivism. The
failure to account for interaction between substance abuse and
age is significant because there is evidence indicating that the
risk of recidivism associated with prior substance abuse does
162
indeed vary with age. This shortcoming is relevant for risk
factors other than history of substance abuse because interactions between multiple risk factors are likely to have a signifi163
cant impact on the predictive power of the instrument, espe164
cially in offender subpopulations.
Risk assessment instruments frequently assume random
selection, independence of individuals and a lack of interaction
165
between variables. Because, as discussed above, these assumptions are unlikely to be justified in practice, published
157. Id.; see also O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 4, at 140 (noting that although older inmates are less likely to reoffend than younger inmates, “[b]y no
means should it be inferred that all old prisoners are good risks or all youngsters poor risks”).
158. O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 4, at 140.
159. See RAYNOR ET AL., supra note 128, at 65.
160. See Risk to Re-offend Score Chart, supra note 131.
161. See id.
162. Cf. Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., Age and the Distribution of Crime,
94 AM. J. SOC. 803, 821 (finding that the risk of committing a substancerelated crime is dramatically skewed toward younger offenders).
163. E.g., MICHAEL SHADER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RISK FACTORS FOR
DELINQUENCY: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/frd030127.pdf; cf. David A. Wolfe & Robin McGee, Dimensions
of Child Maltreatment and Their Relationship to Adolescent Adjustment, 6
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 165, 178 (1994) (noting that interactions between
risk factors are “powerful predictors” of child maltreatment).
164. See RAYNOR ET AL., supra note 128, at 65.
165. See id.; Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245 n.1.
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studies evaluating risk assessment instruments tend to over166
state their predictive power.
B. GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT
It is well-recognized that the output of a statistical model
167
is only as good as the input data. In the risk assessment context, the “garbage in, garbage out” problem comes up when the
instrument requires subjective input factors that are difficult to
168
169
measure accurately, even in a controlled research setting.
Many risk assessment models incorporate subjective varia170
171
bles which are notoriously difficult to measure consistently.
The garbage in, garbage out problem is especially likely to apply to dynamic factors not apparent until the individual has
been observed in the prison environment because such dynamic
factors tend to focus on subjective evaluations rather than on
172
easily categorized characteristics. Given the unavoidable difficulty in consistently and accurately measuring such factors,
173
there is likely to be non-negligible error in these data points.
For example, Alabama’s risk assessment instrument, used to
guide parole decision-making, asks the rater to evaluate where
on a four-point scale an inmate’s marital and family relationships fall—from “[g]ood support and influence” to “[s]erious

166. See Patrick Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age
of Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 524 (2006) (noting “most models incorporate too many simplifications and occasionally unrealistic assumptions to be
accurate”).
167. See e.g., Clive R. Hollin, Treatment Programs for Offenders: MetaAnalysis, “What Works,” and Beyond, 22 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 361, 367
(1999) (noting the “garbage in, garbage out” problem in using meta-analysis to
evaluate the efficacy of correctional programs).
168. Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 280.
169. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1845, 1875 (2003) (pointing out that the developer of one risk assessment instrument “recognizes its subjective nature and recommends that at least two
independent ratings be obtained and averaged” (quotation marks omitted)).
170. For example, the LSI-R takes into account multiple subjective risk
factors including the offender’s “peer interactions,” “authority interactions,”
and whether the offender is “supportive of crime.” Holsinger, supra note 114,
at 312–13.
171. See Lisa M. Dennis, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: Assessing Expert Predictions of Future Violence in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 292, 307 (2002).
172. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 575–76.
173. See id.
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174

domestic discord or domestic violence.” It may be that family
support, when perfectly measured, is an excellent predictor of
175
recidivism; it is less clear that the same question item administered in practice produces high-quality data points. In keeping with the garbage in, garbage out principle, the inclusion of
such error-ridden inputs produces risk scores that are unrelia176
ble in unpredictable ways. This concern is amplified when instruments are administered by untrained individuals, in real177
world settings, with uncooperative subjects.
C. THE UNKNOWN PREDICTIVE POWER OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
COMPLIANT MODELING
Apart from the statistical limitations of risk assessment,
its use may be subject to legal limitations. Several factors typically used in statistical risk assessment, if tested through the
178
appeals process, may not pass constitutional muster. Recent
drafts of the MPC note, without explanation, that considering
179
race and ethnicity “raises serious constitutional concerns,”
but find, again without discussion, that consideration of gender
180
in risk assessment is permissible. Upon closer examination,
the MPC drafters are spot-on in suggesting that including race
or ethnicity into the list of factors built into a risk assessment
instrument used at either parole or sentencing is unconstitu181
tional. Their position on gender, however, is not convincing
182
under the case law.

174. Appendix C, supra note 112.
175. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that family structure and family
criminality are predictors of recidivism. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583.
176. See Hollin, supra note 167, at 367.
177. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 528.
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
179. Id. at reporter’s note i; see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6B.06(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). But see MARCUS, supra note 113,
at 10 (incorporating race/ethnicity into his risk assessment tool).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.06(4)(b) (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007). The drafters do not justify this statement with an explicit constitutional discussion nor do they explicate exactly what “grave concerns” trouble
them.
181. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that national origin cannot be the basis for determining a sentence).
182. See, e.g., Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000)
(holding that considering gender in sentencing violated the defendant’s equal
protection rights).
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Because the vast majority of risk assessment instruments
183
do not consider race directly, there remains a question of
whether analysis of factors that have nearly complete overlap
184
with race is constitutional. For example, the frequently-used
LSI-R takes into consideration whether the offender lives in a
185
high-crime neighborhood. Because, at least in some cities,
neighborhood of residence correlates nearly perfectly with
186
race, this factor, at least in those geographic locations, operates as a proxy for race.
While constitutional case law does not strictly prohibit all
187
consideration of race or nationality at sentencing, it minimally requires the government to have a good reason for such consideration. A satisfactory reason may be that the defendant’s
188
race or ethnicity is relevant to rehabilitation or deterrence. A
stricter court may even require the defendant’s race or ethnicity to have been specifically connected to the commission of the
189
defendant’s crime. Risk factors that overlap closely with race
are unlikely to meet either of these standards. The empirical
literature simply cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between race or ethnicity and propensity toward recidivism or rehabilitation; at best, validated risk factors are correlated with
190
outcomes. Further, even if such a causal relationship could be
conclusively proven at the population level, it is not reasonable
to conflate population-level causation with individual-level cau-

183. But see, e.g., MARCUS, supra note 113.
184. This concern is raised, and explained away by the MPC’s drafters.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.06 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1997).
185. D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES L. BONTA, LSI-R PROFILE REPORT FOR REX
DARLINGTON 4 (2001), available at http://www.psychassessments.com.au/
products/59/prod59_report1.pdf.
186. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON
URBAN & METRO. POLICY, RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE 2000 CENSUS: PROMISING NEWS 5–7 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/
glaeser.pdf (noting that the Midwest and Northeast remain more segregated
than the South and West and that the largest cities are “significantly more
segregated” than the national average).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.
1989) (noting that geography may be considered if related to the crime).
188. E.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974).
189. E.g., Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1356.
190. See John Q. La Fond, Clinical, Legal and Ethical Issues for Mental
Health Professionals in Implementing a Sexual Predator Law in the United
States, in SEX AND VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT 116 (David P. Farrington et al. eds., 2001) (“Even validated risk factors
only establish correlations; they do not establish causation.”).
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191

sation.
Because a population-level causal relationship between race or ethnicity or proxy factors is only dubiously sup192
ported by the literature, and a risk assessment instrument’s
reliance on population-level correlation could never show indi193
vidual-level causation, a court would be unlikely to find that
inclusion of risk factors that stand proxy for race demonstrates
a general or specific propensity for rehabilitation or recidi194
vism. Even aside from the constitutional concern, there is a
distinct danger of bad public policy when correlation is confused with causation in this context. This is evident in one
study’s reasoning that the correlation between minority race
and criminal behavior indicates that minority populations
“should have additional correctional resources made available
195
to them” but does not consider what underlying societal conditions might have produced the correlation. Similarly, gender
is not generally a permissible consideration at either sentencing or parole because the statistical relationship between gender and recidivism does not indicate a propensity for recidivism
or rehabilitation and it is not specifically connected with the
196
commission of a particular crime.
In order to create a risk assessment instrument that does
not offend the Constitution, race and ethnicity, factors closely
overlapping with race and ethnicity, and gender must be
197
198
purged from the list of inputs. But because race and gender
199
are fairly reliable predictors of criminal behavior, removing
them will reduce the predictive capability of risk assess200
ments. Nailing down the exact magnitude of this reduction in
191. Such an unfounded conclusion is known as an “ecological fallacy.” See
Sharon Schwartz, The Fallacy of the Ecological Fallacy: The Potential Misuse
of a Concept and the Consequences, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 819, 820–22 (1994).
192. Id. at 821.
193. Id.
194. See Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1356 (requiring a specific connection to
the crime); United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974) (requiring only a general connection).
195. See Holsinger, supra note 114, at 318. It is not entirely clear what
such “correctional resources” might include, but certainly one reasonable interpretation is that correctional resources is code for more incarceration.
196. See Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000).
197. Reitz, Sentencing, supra note 23, at 486.
198. Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released
in 1994, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 61 (2002).
199. Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583.
200. Cf. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 27–28 (describing the Virginia Sentencing Commis-
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predictive power is difficult for two reasons. First, extracting
constitutionally dubious input factors from instruments that
consider interaction between factors may be impossible without
201
rerunning the initial analyses. Second, even if the initial development studies are susceptible to manipulation that would
reveal the predictive power of only a subset of the included risk
factors, these development studies may not be published or
may not be published with enough methodological detail to al202
low this type of calibration.
The exclusion of gender presents an added wrinkle not present when factors overlapping with race or ethnicity are ex203
cluded. Specifically, because women recidivate at a lower rate
204
than men do, removing gender from the model artificially in205
flates women’s risk assessment scores. To some extent, this
effect is moderated by the fact that there are systematic differences between male and female offenders which mean female
offenders tend to receive lower risk scores even when the in206
strument does not explicitly consider gender. However, the
problem remains, leaving parole boards and sentencing judges
with two bad choices: (1) despite the constitutional concerns,
use an instrument that considers gender because it more accurately predicts women’s risk or (2) comply with the constitutional prohibition on unwarranted consideration of gender and
tolerate that women will receive higher risk scores.
D. RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN PRACTICE
The foregoing critiques are primarily based on the empirical literature examining statistical risk assessment. In practice, these limitations continue to apply and are amplified by
likely errors caused by improper implementation and administration of the instruments as well by the manner in which results of risk assessments are communicated to decision-

sion’s efforts to reassess the validity of its instrument after choosing not to include race, despite its predictive power).
201. See id.
202. See Sachsenmaier & Lally, supra note 135, at 26–27.
203. Because non-white race is positively associated with recidivism, see
Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583, not considering race tends to pull risk
scores for non-white offenders down.
204. See Langan & Levin, supra note 198, at 61.
205. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.06(2)(a) cmt. d (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
206. See Holsinger, supra note 114, at 313.
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207

makers. Problems with implementation might include failure
to conduct validation studies in the population in which the in208
strument is to be used or alterations to the original model on
which the instrument is based. For example, Texas uses a risk
assessment instrument originally developed by the state of
209
Wisconsin. Texas alters the instrument by weighting one risk
factor, whether the inmate has committed an assault in the
previous five years, more heavily than the factor is weighted in
210
the original instrument. Alterations, including adding risk
factors or reweighting risk factors, are particularly troubling
because such alterations interrupt the integrity of the underly211
ing analysis.
The predictive power of risk assessment instruments may
also be limited by suboptimal administration. The empirical
literature repeatedly emphasizes the importance of proper staff
training to reach the full predictive potential of risk assessment
212
instruments. In practice, however, the staff members admin213
istering risk assessment instruments and the individuals in214
terpreting the results may not have the required training.
Moreover, uneven staff skill levels caused by inadequate training diminish inter-rater reliability by introducing systematic
215
differences in risk scores between different administrators. It
may be especially difficult to detect problems caused by poor
administration when instruments are used at stages of the
216
criminal process that have little knowledgeable oversight.
207. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 528.
208. See KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 13.
209. MARC LEVIN, POLICY PERSPECTIVE: THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN
ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY IN TEXAS CORRECTIONS 2 (2010),
available at www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/documents/2010-07-PP15
-RiskAssessment_ml.pdf.
210. Id.
211. Cf. Berk & Freedman, supra note 144, at 245–46 (discussing the assumptions underlying statistical models).
212. E.g., id.; CAMPBELL, supra note 101, at 38; Holsinger, supra note 114,
at 310.
213. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 526 (comparing predictive power
of the LSI-R when used by formally trained and untrained staff members).
214. For example, parole board members interpreting risk assessment
scores may not have expertise in criminal psychology. See MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 47-7-5(2) (2009) (amended 2012).
215. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15.
216. Cf. D.A. Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation: Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 26 (1990) (expressing
dismay at the frequency with which criminal justice professionals are unfamiliar with simple concepts of risk and recidivism).
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Finally, the manner in which the results of risk assessment
instruments are typically communicated to decision-makers
impacts their utility. Decision-makers generally receive the results of a risk assessment expressed as a point estimate of a
217
probability of recidivism. By relying on a point estimate of
probability of recidivism, the decision-maker is blind to the lev218
el of error inherent in that probability calculation. So while a
parole board member or sentencing judge may get a report that
indicates an offender has a “high” risk of recidivism, she is not
likely to be informed of the confidence interval surrounding
that point estimate.
In sum, statistical risk assessments suffer from several key
deficiencies that limit their predictive power. Even if these instruments are administered and implemented perfectly—a
practical impossibility—they can only predict the expected
population behavior and this prediction is inevitably uncertain.
In no instance can a risk assessment instrument ever predict
219
with certainty what any one person will do in the future.
III. BALANCING PREDICTIVE POWER AND
PROCEDURAL PROTECTION
Because statistical risk assessment is both imperfect and
220
useful to the criminal justice system, the use of statistical
risk assessment to make choices about incarceration should be
carefully controlled. A recent draft of the MPC proposes language to this effect: “The commission shall develop instruments
or processes, supported by current and ongoing recidivism research, that will estimate the relative risks that individual offenders pose to public safety through their future criminal con221
duct.” The Code further clarifies that instruments may be
217. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 29 (describing Virginia’s policy decision to recommend diversion from incarceration for those offenders whose scores indicate a
less than 12% probability of reconviction within three years).
218. See Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the “Margins of Error” of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60, s61 (2007).
219. See La Fond, supra note 190, at 115–16 (“It should be noted that actuarial prediction tools only identify offenders who are members of a group that
has these probabilities of committing another sex offense. They do not necessarily identify which individual members of the group will reoffend.”).
220. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 42, at 1406 (noting that statistical risk assessment predicts risk of recidivism more accurately than intuition alone).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011).
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incorporated into sentencing guidelines of the state when they
222
“prove sufficiently reliable.” The Code’s drafters argue that
placing risk assessment at sentencing “‘domesticates’ the use of
risk assessments by repositioning them in the open forum of
the courtroom, where the tools devised . . . are available for inspection, and where the constitution guarantees the offender
223
legal representation to contest any adverse findings.”
This Part expands on the reasoning of the drafters of the
MPC and argues that statistical risk assessment potentially
provides sentencing judges with useful information relevant to
determining an appropriate sentence and that the procedures
available to defendants at sentencing protect defendants from
overreliance on these imperfect instruments better than the
procedures available at parole. Indeed, one major advantage of
this procedural adjustment is that a skillful defense attorney is
able to draw the sentencing judge’s attention to statistical
weaknesses discussed above. This Part further suggests that
the MPC be modified to include a definition of “sufficiently reliable” and that sentencing judges be specifically instructed to
consider the uncertainty of risk estimates produced by any risk
assessment instruments in order to provide defendants with
even more robust protection.
A. WHY USE RISK ASSESSMENT AT ALL?
Despite their limitations, risk assessment instruments
have considerable value. Recidivist criminals are a serious con224
cern, and scientists have empirically demonstrated that statistical risk assessment much more accurately predicts recidi225
vism than do individuals relying on intuition and experience.
For this reason, judges should be allowed to use the results of
statistical risk assessment, as long as the procedural protections available to defendants are adequate and the instrument
226
sufficiently reliable to guard against injustice.

222. Id.
223. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011).
224. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, The Identification of
“Career Criminals” from “Chronic Offenders” in a Cohort, 2 LAW & POL’Y Q.
321, 322 (1980) (citing a study finding a small proportion of offenders are responsible for a large portion of criminal offenses).
225. Wolff, supra note 42, at 1406 n.73.
226. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011).
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Setting aside for a moment the issue of procedural protection, risk assessment may actually better prevent recidivism
when it is used at sentencing than when it issued at parole. Because spending any time in prison at all is a strong predictor of
227
228
recidivism, especially for low risk offenders, using risk assessment to identify low-risk offenders appropriate for work release or other less restrictive sentences may reduce crime by
229
preventing this risk factor from ever developing. The second
draft of the MPC resonates with this reasoning, advising judges
and sentencing commissions to use low risk scores as a mitigating factor and grounds for a downward departure in sentenc230
ing. Thus, moving the use of statistical risk assessment forward in the criminal process may reduce state expenditures on
unnecessary incarceration, prevent recidivism, and promote the
liberty of low-risk offenders. This strategy has proven effective
in Virginia. The state reports that using such a strategy diverted 555 offenders from incarceration and saved state and local
governments over $8.5 million dollars between 1997 and
231
1999.
B. SENTENCING, NOT PAROLE, IS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM TO
CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF STATISTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Using risk assessment at sentencing rather than at parole
both better serves the public interest in preventing recidivism
and is fairer to defendants. The major argument for waiting
until parole to use risk assessment is that dynamic factors related to inmates’ in-prison behavior are predictive of recidi232
vism. This argument is limited because there is considerable
doubt regarding whether subjective dynamic factors can be or
227. See Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 583 (reporting criminal history as
a predictor of recidivism).
228. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & EDWARD J. LATESSA, UNDERSTANDING THE RISK PRINCIPLE: HOW AND WHY CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTIONS CAN
HARM LOW-RISK OFFENDERS 7 (2004), available at http://www.yourhonor.com/
dwi/sentencing/RiskPrinciple.pdf.
229. For example, Virginia now uses risk assessment at sentencing with
the goal of diverting offenders from the prison system and reducing overall
inmate populations. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 9–10.
230. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011).
231. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 100.
232. See Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 591 (arguing dynamic factors
“must be included” in risk assessment).
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233

are measured reliably. The argument for including dynamic
risk factors is further undercut by the relatively undeveloped
and untested theoretical basis for measuring such dynamic fac234
tors. Even if we assume that such factors can be accurately
and reliably measured, there is reasonable reluctance to connect an individual’s behavior while incarcerated to his or her
235
behavior while integrated into society. Incarceration is a controlled atmosphere and very different from the outside world,
so some experts question whether in-custody behavior gives a
reliable read on how an offender will behave once exposed to
236
old temptations, habits, and associates. In the real world, the
exclusion of dynamic risk factors may make little difference.
According to a 2007 survey conducted by the state of Connecticut, the majority of state parole boards use instruments that
237
include only one or no dynamic factors. For the foregoing reasons, very little predictive power is lost if states use only infor238
mation that is available at sentencing.
Moreover, because the procedural protections at these
stages are different, it is fairer to defendants to limit the use of
risk assessment to sentencing. An individual’s opportunity to
challenge the results or admission of a score yielded from the
use of a risk assessment instrument is dramatically different
depending on whether that person is a defendant facing sen239
tencing or an inmate hoping for parole release. In crafting a
policy for appropriate use of risk assessment, policymakers
must balance the social value of preventing crime and the potential unfairness to defendants resulting from the very serious
240
limitations of risk assessment. Allowing defendants to avail
themselves of the procedural protections available at the sen-

233. See, e.g., Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at
280–81.
234. See Gendreau et al., supra note 8, at 576 (expressing concern at the
lack of empirical focus on dynamic factors).
235. O’Leary & Glaser, supra note 4, at 157–58.
236. See id.
237. RATANSI & COX, supra note 112, at 10–11 (2007).
238. See CHAMPION, supra note 22, at 243 (arguing that better success predictors come outside of prison).
239. See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 801 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (finding inmates are not entitled to personal parole hearings, access to
their own files, or the ability to call witnesses to appear in their behalf).
240. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 26, at 29–30 (describing the policy rationale behind selecting a risk threshold for diversion).
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tencing stage appropriately achieves this balance. This is so
even without the statutory innovations described below.
The single most important procedural check on the use of
risk assessment is the availability of a defense attorney at sen241
tencing. At sentencing, the defense lawyer can advocate to
obtain the statistical risk assessment instrument, the instrument’s underlying theory and methodology, and the defendant’s
242
risk assessment report. Without this kind of access, the defendant could not even begin to challenge the accuracy or ap243
propriateness of the risk assessment. Once a defense attorney
has access to information related to the risk assessment instrument, he can carefully examine whether the assumptions
underlying the statistical model are justified and check whether the instrument has been validated in the local population.
Similarly, an attorney can gather information about whether
the instrument relies on inputs that are particularly difficult to
measure and whether the method in which the instrument was
administered might damage its reliability. If his investigation
raises concerns, an attorney can draw the court’s attention to
them and advocate for the assessment to be considered in light
of its weaknesses.
Even if a state chose not to adopt a statute establishing a
minimum level of reliability for risk assessment instruments, a
skillful defense lawyer could still effectively advocate for his or
her client by articulating a constitutional challenge to particu244
lar factors included in the assessment. From there, a defense
lawyer might argue that because constitutionally compliant instruments have limited predictive power, the instrument is not
reliable enough to be admitted at all. Although the only court to
examine the issue has found that statistical risk assessment is
245
appropriate at sentencing, the defendant in that case did not
specifically challenge the instrument’s reliability or its consti241. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (finding that a lawyer can “take steps” to protect the defendant’s due process rights).
242. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 1408–09 (“Risk assessment methodology—
whatever its components—ought to be shared among . . . prosecutors, defense
attorneys, probation officers, judges, prison officials, parole boards, and parole
officers.”).
243. See Sachsenmaier & Lally, supra note 135, at 27 (detailing the process
of verifying risk assessment accuracy).
244. As discussed in Part II.C, the inclusion of some factors in risk assessments, including gender and close proxies for race and gender, is likely unconstitutional. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
245. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010).
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246

tutionality. Instead, that defendant argued that the judge
failed to provide an individualized sentence by relying too heav247
ily on the risk score. It is certainly possible, in the absence of
a statutory reliability standard, that a court would find risk assessment admissible because it is objectively more reliable than
248
the psychiatric prediction of future dangerousness held ad249
missible at sentencing by the United States Supreme Court.
Even so, admissibility decisions involving scientific evidence
250
are notoriously unpredictable and so it is conceivable that a
court, prompted by a defense attorney, might find that a statistical risk assessment instrument is so unreliable that it is in251
admissible. Even if the court ultimately admitted the risk
score, a skillful attack on its reliability or constitutionality
might draw the court’s attention to the limitations of the in252
strument and lead it to afford the risk score less weight.
At sentencing, the defendant also has the advantage of the
253
opportunity to appeal the sentence and a qualified finder-of254
fact. There is ample evidence indicating that people tend to
over-rely on scientific evidence such as statistical risk assess255
ment because it appears objective and conclusive. Judges are
246. See Brief of Appellee at 10, Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind.
2010) (No. 79S02-0908-CR-365).
247. Id.
248. See Palmer, supra note 139, at 8 (stating that “it is generally accepted” that statistical prediction is more reliable than clinical prediction).
249. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).
250. See Cassandra Welch, Flexibile Standards, Deferential Review:
Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1086 (2006).
251. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment: How a Developing Science Can Enhance Accuracy and Accountability, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 176, 177 (2004) (arguing admissibility decisions
are unpredictable “because ‘reliability’ is a continuous variable (no method is
perfectly reliable), and the evidentiary tests do not specify how much reliability is required. It is the underlying substantive law—the legal context—that
determines how much reliability is necessary”).
252. See State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317, 320 (S.C. 1982) (opining that the
defendant’s objection to the reliability of the evidence was relevant to the
weight the evidence ought to receive).
253. E.g., United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (challenging
the constitutionality of a sentence).
254. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
255. This phenomenon has been particularly explored in the context of the
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Although the Daubert test is inapplicable at sentencing hearings, the academic critique of that test also applies at sentencing.
See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the
Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 920 (1994) (arguing that no matter what the
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qualified to understand evidence of all sorts, and so are wellsuited to handle the challenge of reasonably weighing the value
and limitations of statistical risk assessments. In particular,
judges have extensive experience with expert scientific evi256
dence. In most legal contexts, judges are trusted to be the
257
gatekeepers for all scientific evidence, so interpreting the risk
scores produced by risk assessment instruments fits neatly in
258
the judicial wheelhouse.
By contrast, at parole, an inmate is unlikely to be able to
meaningfully object to the use of a statistical risk assessment
instrument. The inmate’s likely pro se status and the lack of an
admissibility test at parole mean that an inmate will rarely
have the professional support necessary or the legal hook required to challenge the reliability of a risk assessment instru259
ment. Along these same lines, the lack of formal process and
legal representation mean that an inmate is unlikely to be able
to argue a risk assessment instrument violates the Constitution, even though the prohibition on consideration of certain
characteristics applies just as much at parole as it does at sen260
tencing. Even if an inmate manages to overcome these obstacles and effectively express an objection to the use of risk assessment, the inmate is at the mercy of the members of the
parole board who are much less qualified than judges to assess
261
the quality of complex evidence. Furthermore, inmates at pa262
role do not generally have a meaningful avenue for appeal.
Recognizing that statistical risk assessment has real value
to protect the public, reduce expenditures, and divert low-risk
standard of admissibility, judges will defer to “what certain experts think”).
256. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey
of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001) (noting that “judges are central and active figures in admissibility decision-making”).
257. See id.
258. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011) (arguing that the appropriate interpretation of risk assessment
instruments “will reside in the discretion of the trial judge”).
259. See id. § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
260. See United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding
consideration of race impermissible at sentencing); Tex. Supporters of Workers
World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 511 F.Supp. 149, 155 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (finding a parole board may not consider race in making its release
decision).
261. See Andrews et al., supra note 216, at 26.
262. See Reitz, Indeterminate Sentencing Model, supra note 20, at 277–79
(describing the wide discretion granted to parole boards).
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offenders from incarceration, it is good public policy to make
use of the technology. The array of procedural protections
available to defendants at sentencing, and unavailable to inmates seeking parole release, all point to using statistical risk
assessment exclusively at sentencing. The requirement of counsel, evidentiary standards, and oversight by qualified trial
judges combine to provide a forum that is well-equipped to
manage the advantages and limitations of statistical risk as263
sessment.
C. PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE MPC
Because statistical risk assessment is unreliable in some
264
circumstances and the stakes are high in this context—no
less than the difference between freedom and incarceration—
the relatively minimal evidentiary reliability standard required
265
by the Constitution may be inadequate. Although the MPC’s
suggestion that “sufficiently reliable” risk assessment instruments ought to be used at sentencing is sound given the potential upsides of using risk assessment, policymakers and defendants may benefit from a statutory definition of “sufficiently
266
reliable.”
In particular, the MPC should specify that a risk assessment instrument must be based on analyses of the statistical
relationships between objective criteria and recidivism in a
sample drawn from the population of the state in which the instrument is to be used or in a substantially similar population.
Requiring objective criteria instead of subjective criteria reduc267
es the risk of error associated with inexpert administration
268
and low inter-rater reliability. Similarly, by using an instrument based on the state’s population or a population similar to
it, states can avoid inaccuracies in risk scores resulting from a
poor match between the population used in the underlying
analysis and the population in which the state actually uses the
269
instrument. In either case, the instrument should be validat263.
264.
265.
266.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 139, at 7.
See, e.g., People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 262, 271 (Ill. 1984).
Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992) (arguing that when an issue arises frequently, it is
reasonable to anticipate at the outset how to resolve the question by adopting
a specific rule).
267. See Flores et al., supra note 121, at 526.
268. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 15.
269. See Lowenkamp et al., supra note 147, at 560.
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ed periodically in the state’s population to assure that it re270
mains effective even when the state’s population changes. In
addition, the MPC should specify that sentencing judges considering the results of a risk assessment instrument must be
provided with the confidence intervals associated with the results and a copy of any assessment that has been conducted.
These two additions to the MPC’s draft section 6B.09
would enhance the section’s purpose by providing structure to
the delicate balance between protecting public safety and responsibly stewarding public funds and protecting defendants
from unfair use of risk assessment. Although the MPC is not
binding in any jurisdiction, it is highly influential: over twothirds of states have adopted at least some part of the Code
271
with some states adopting it nearly in full. The proposed revision to the MPC, if adopted, is similarly likely to influence
state legislatures developing their own policies on the responsible use of statistical risk assessment.
CONCLUSION
Statistical risk assessment has social value because it prevents crime by identifying high risk offenders and reduces societal costs by diverting low-risk offenders from incarceration.
Although risk assessment instruments are presently used by
both judges and parole boards, states should, as a recent draft
of the MPC suggests in section 6B.09, limit the use of sufficiently reliable instruments to the sentencing stage. Doing so
would allow society to reap the benefits of risk assessment and
would control against inappropriate use of such instruments by
allowing defendants to avail themselves of the procedural protections available at sentencing. Because statistical risk assessment instruments have limited predictive power and are
susceptible to improper use, the MPC should modify section
6B.09 to include a definition of “sufficiently reliable,” which
states should, in turn, adopt. Setting a statutory standard for
minimally reliable risk assessment instruments would allow
states to ensure a fair balance between the social value of preventing recidivism by predicting risk and protecting defendants
by refraining from unnecessarily labeling them as high risk
based on uncertain statistics.
270. See Schlager & Simourd, supra note 154, at 546 (revealing through a
validation study the limitations of the LSI-R in certain populations).
271. Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 857, 858 n.3 (1994).

